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I.
By first-order discrimination, I mean what we
ordinarily understand by the term "discrimination" in
political contexts: A manifest attitude in which a
particular attribute of a person that is irrelevant to
judgments

of that person's

competence,

intrinsic

value

or

e.g. her race, gender, class, sexual

orientation, or religious or ethnic affIliation, is seen as
a source of disvalue or incompetence; in general, as a
source of inferiority.2

I shall call an attribute so

perceived a primary disvalued attribute, and a person
perceived as bearing such an attribute the disvaluee.
Conversely, I shall call any such arbitrary attribute,
when seen as a source of value or superiority,

a

primary valued attribute, and a person perceived as
bearing such an attribute the valuee. By second-order
discrimination,

I will understand the attitude within

which a primary disvalued or valued attribute in turn
confers disvalue

or value respectively

on further

attributes of the disvaluee or valuee respectively.

I

shall refer to these latter as secondary disvalued (or
valued) attributes.
Second-order
following

way.

discrimination

A disvaluee's

works in the

primary disvalued

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -3

attribute, say, being a male homosexual, causes the
second-order

discriminator

to view some further

attribute of the disvaluee,

say, being an eloquent

speaker, in a negative light. The respect in which this
further attribute is seen as negative depends on the
range of possible descriptions it might satisfy, as well
as the context in which it appears. Thus, for example,
the second-order
disvaluee's

discriminator

eloquence

might

view the

as purple prose, or empty

rhetoric, or as precious, flowery, or mannered. These
predicates are not interchangeable for the second-order
discriminator.

Nor are they taken to be arbitrarily

applied. The second-order discriminator will choose
from among them to express his disvaluation
response

to contingencies

of the situation

in
and

individuals involved. The second-order discriminator
may, in all sincerity, explain his disvaluation

with

reference to impartially applied aesthetic standards, or
to his ingrown, native suspicion of big words.

But

the crucial feature of second-order discrimination is
that the actual explanation

for his disvaluing

the

person's eloquence, in whatever respect he disvalues

it, is the person's primary disvalued attribute of being
a male homosexual.
Does second-order

discrimination

as thus

defmed ever actually occur? Some familiar examples

4~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

of it include attaching disvalue to a person's having
rhythm, by reason of its putative connection with her
being black; or attaching disvalue to a person's being
very smart, by reason of its putative connection with
his being Jewish. Both of these cases are examples of
discriminatory stereotyping, in which some arbitrary
attribute is falsely taken to be characteristic of persons
of a particular race or ethnic or religious affiliation.
But I mean to call attention to a slightly different
feature of these examples.

Someone who practices

second-order discrimination

regards a black person

who has rhythm as vulgar, salacious, or offensive; at
the very least, undignified.

Similarly, such a person

regards

who is very smart as

a Jewish

sophistical,

person

glib, or crafty,

ungentlemanly;

or as subversive

or

at the very least, untrustworthy.

In

both cases, attributes that are in themselves salutary,
or at least neutral, are castigated by the second-order
discriminator, by reason of the disvalue conferred on
them by the primary disvalued attribute. This is what
makes them examples of second-order discrimination.
These familiar, stereotypic examples of secondorder discrimination do not exhaust the repertoire of
higher-order discrimination, for many reasons. First,
orders of discrimination can, in theory, be multiplied
indefinitely.

So, for example, a case of third-order

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -5

discrimination would involve what I shall call tertiary
disvalued attributes: The primary disvalued attribute
(say, being black) confers disvalue on a further,
secondary disvalued attribute (having rhythm), which
in tum confers disvalue on yet a further attribute of the
person (say, being a good dancer). Having rhythm is
seen as vulgar, by reason of its association with being
black, and being a good dancer is then seen as
exhibitionistic (say), by reason of its association with
having rhythm.

In any such case, the primary

attribute is in fact irrelevant to judgments of a person's
value or competence.
confers

Hence the value or disvalue it

on secondary,

tertiary,

etc. attributes

is

bogus.
The n-order disvalue relation is transitive, in
that, for example, if being black confers disvalue on
having rhythm, and having rhythm confers disvalue
on being a good dancer, then being black confers
disvalue

on being a good dancer.

The n-order

disvalue relation is also inclusive, in that the primary
disvalued

attribute

poisons

the

higher-order

discriminator's evaluations of all further attributes of
the disvaluee.
attribute

For example, the primary disvalued

of being

black

may confer

disvalue,

alternatively, on a dancer's classical styling: Classical
styling in a black dancer may be seen as inappropriate,

or as an obscene parody of traditional ballet.3 The
primary disvalued attribute also confers disvalue on
other, unrelated

attributes

of the disvaluee:

her

appearance, accent, mode of dress, etc.4
The inclusiveness
relation

underscores

of the n-order disvalue
a

second

reason

why

stereotypical cases of second-order discrimination do
not

exhaust

discrimination:

the

repertoire

of

Nonstereotypical

higher-order
traits

are also

recruited to receive value or disvalue from primary
attributes to suit particular occasions.

We do not

ordinarily think of classical styling in dance as an
attribute about which discriminators might have any
particular attitude. But this may be mistaken. Higherorder discrimination
stereotypical
attributes.
attributes

is not concerned solely

secondary,

tertiary,

with

etc. disvalued

It may be concerned with .l!.DX further
of the person

on which

the primary

disvalued attribute itself confers disvalue. Thus, for
example, being Jewish (or black, or a woman) may
confer disvalue on being smart, which in turn may
confer disvalue on being intellectually
person's

intellectual

prolificity

prolific: A

may be seen as

evidence of logorrhea, or lack of critical conscience,
and may thus poison

the evaluation

of those

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -7

intellectual

products themselves.

A first test for

ascertaining whether the disvalue of some attribute of
a person is to be explained as a case of higher-order
discrimination

is to ascertain whether or not that

attribute is disvalued uniformly across individuals,
regardless of anything that might count as a primary
disvalued attribute for a higher-order discriminator. If
someone is just as contemptuous

of Fred Astaire's

having rhythm as they are of Michael Jackson's, or
just as contemptuous

of intellectual

prolificity

in

Balzac as in Isaac Asimov, then the charge of higherorder discrimination may be defeated.
Stereotypes

change

in accordance

with

changes in the objects of discrimination, as different
populations

seek access to the goods, services and

opportunities enjoyed by the advantaged; and primary
and

higher-order

accordingly.

disvalued

attributes

change

For instance, the anti-Semitic response

to the attempts of Jewish intellectuals to achieve full
assimilation into the institutions of higher education in
this country

frequently

found expression

disvaluative

description

of assertively

in the

ambitious

Jewish academics as pushy or opportunistic.

ow

similarly situated blacks and women frequently enjoy

that title.

Conversely,

disvalued

attributes

those with such primary
who attempt

to substitute

diplomacy for assertion are characterized by higherorder discriminators as manipulative, obsequious, or
sycophantic.

A second test for ascertaining whether

or not the disvalue of some attribute of a person is to
be explained as a case of higher-order discrimination
is to ascertain

whether

there is any alternative

attribute, conduct or manner, directed toward the same
goal- i.e. of gaining access to unjustly withheld social
advantages,

that avoids or deflects

the disvalue

conferred by the primary disvalued attribute. If there
is not - if, that is, whatever your strategy, you're
damned if you do and damned if you don't, then the
charge of higher-order discrimination is prima-facie
justified.
Other arbitrary attributes, not just the familiar
political ones, can function

as primary disvalued

attributes to a higher-order discriminator.

Physical

appearance, style of diction, social bearing, familial,
educational,
associates,

or professional

pedigree,

circle

of

manner of dress, are among the more

familiar, if less widely acknowledged,
higher-order discrimination.

objects of

Some of these attributes

are often assumed to go hand-in-hand with, or even
be partially definitive of, more widely recognized

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -9

primary disvalued attributes.

For example, higher-

order discriminators may tend to assume that ethnic
identity is inherently connected with a certain physical
appearance

(Jews have dark, curly hair and long

noses), that racial identity is connected with a certain
style of diction and class background (blacks speak
Black English and come from the ghetto), or that
gender identity is connected with a certain social
bearing

(women

emotional).

are sympathetic,

passive,

and

This is how a stereotype is formed. But

again I mean to call attention to a slightly different
point: These attributes themselves may be seen as
sources of disvalue, independently
connection

with

such

disvalued attributes.

of their possible

stereotypically

primary

Someone who has all of the

valued race, ethnic, religious,

class, and gender

attributes, but lacks the valued style of diction, mode
of self-presentation,
pedigrees

may

or educational or professional
be

subject

to

higher-order

discrimination just as fully as someone who lacks all
of the former attributes but has all of the latter.

In

both cases, this means that their other attributes - their
personality characteristics, interests, or achievements
- will be seen as higher-order disvalued attributes, by
reason of their association with these equally arbitrary
primary disvalued attributes.

10- - ,...,
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This shows

that the first-order

political

discrimination with which we are familiar is merely a
special

case

of a more

phenomenon

general

psychological

which is not limited

to first-order

political discrimination at all. However, higher-order
discrimination

usually includes it; for it would be

psychologically

unusual, to say the least, to find an

individual who is in general corrupt in his evaluation
of a person's
described,

other attributes

yet impartial

in the ways just

and scrupulous

in his

evaluations of blacks, Jews, women, gays, etc. and
1illlli: attributes.

Someone who is apt to dislike a

person because of her hair texture or accent or mode
of dress can hardly be expected

to be genuinely

judicious when it comes to judging her gender, race,
class,

sexual orientation,

affiliation.
political

or ethnic

or religious

Hence we can expect that first-order
discrimination

and

higher-order

discrimination in general are to be found together.
Higher-order

discrimination

as

so far

described implies a companion phenomenon, which I
shall call reciprocal hi~her-order discrimination. Here
attributes
competence

irrelevant

to judgments

of a person's

or worth are seen as primary valued

attributes, as sources of value which confer value on
the person's secondary, tertiary, etc. attributes.

Any

- - ,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
- - ,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,....,
,...,
,...,
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one of the primary attributes enumerated so far may
have this function.

For example, a person's gender

may be perceived as conferring value on secondary
attributes, such as his competence to hold a certain
professional position.
may

be perceive

Or a person's familial lineage
as conferring

value

on her

admissability to an institution of higher education. Or
a person's class background
conferring

may be perceived as

value on his manner of dress.

Or a

person's educational pedigree may be perceived as
conferring value on her political pronouncements,
which in turn confers value on her personal lifestyle;
and so on. Each of these examples have an arbitrary
and irrational

quality to them.

reciprocal higher-order
order discrimination

That is because

discrimination,
itself,

like higher-

is an arbitrary

and

irrational attitude.
Higher-order

discrimination

and reciprocal

higher-order

discrimination

are

materially

interdependent.

If a person's having a particular racial

identity is a source of disvalue for a higher-order
discriminator,

then if someone

lacks that racial

identity, they are not seen as tainted by that disvalue.
For example, if a person's being oriental confers
disvalue on his attempts at tact, i.e. if he is therefore
perceived as particularly evasive and inscrutable, then

12- ,...,
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if he were white, he would not be perceived
similarly evasive and inscrutable.

as

For if a higher-

order discriminator recognized that one can be just as
evasive and inscrutable without being oriental, say, if
one has a hidden agenda or lacks social skills, then it
would have to be recognized
~

that those attributes,

than his being oriental, might be conferring

disvalue on his attempts at tact.

Conversely, if a

person's having a particular racial identity is a source
of value for a higher-order

discriminator,

then

someone who lacks that racial identity is not blessed
by that value. For example, if a person's being white
confers value on his attempts at tact, i.e. if he is
therefore viewed as sensitive and reasonable, then if
he were oriental,

he would not be perceived

similarly sensitive and reasonable.

as

For if a higher-

order discriminator recognized that one can be just as
sensitive and reasonable without being white, say, if
one has no personal investment in the issue or has
thought hard about it, then it would have to be
recognized that those attributes, rather than his being
white, might be conferring value on his attempts at
tact.
The two tests for higher-order discrimination
apply

analogously

to reciprocal

higher-order

discrimination: (1) Ascertain whether or not the higher-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -13

order valued attribute is valued uniformly

across

individuals, regardless of anything that might count as
a primary valued attribute for the discriminator.
person's perceived
professional

competence

position

If a

to hold a certain

would not be in any way

diminished if she were black - if, that is, blacks with
comparable

competence

have been hired to such

positions, then the charge of reciprocal higher-order
discrimination

may be defeated.

(2) Ascertain

whether there is any alternative attribute, conduct or
manner, directed toward the same goal - of gaining
access to some social advantage,

that avoids or

deflects the value conferred by the primary valued
attribute. If there is not - if, for example, whether you
are assertively

ambitious

or carefully

diplomatic,

intellectually prolific or intellectually fallow, you can
do no wrong, then the charge of reciprocal higherorder

discrimination

is prima

facie

justified.

Henceforth I shall take higher-order discrimination to
include reciprocal higher-order discrimination.

These

two phenomena demonstrate that one need not be a
blatant

racist,

sexist,

snob,

anti-Semite,

or

homophobe - let us describe such an individual as a
simple first order discriminator - in order to practice
political discrimination.

Higher-order discrimination

is given fullest expression indirectly, by implication,

in seemingly

unrelated

tastes,

preferences,

and

behavior.
II.
So far I have used locutions like "seen as
conferring value/disvalue
association
primary

on" and "by reason of its

with" to describe the relation between

and higher-order

disvalued

or valued

attributes, without saying in any detail in what I take
that relation to consist

It does JlQt consist in the set of

beliefs held by the higher-order discriminator to the
effect that
(1)

(a) agent A has primary disvalued
attribute P;
(b) agent A has n-ary attribute N; and
(c) P confers negative value on ... N.

(1) is faulty because of (c): Only the most perverse
and unrepentant

higher-order

discriminator

would

admit - even to herself - that it is P that confers
negative value on N. On the other hand, only the
most absurdly consistent higher-order discriminator
would affIrm the belief that, in virtue of (1.a) and
(1.b),

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -15

(c') therefore N is of negative value,
period.
This would

be the plight

of the higher-order

discriminator who, in virtue of his contempt for Isaac
Asimov's intellectual prolificity, would feel compelled
to abjure Balzac as well. Instead, (c) must be replaced
by
(c") N, in the way in which it is borne
by A, is of negative value.
(c") is better because it incorporates that locution that
scrupled higher-order discriminators are so reluctant
or unable to further define: For the higher-order
discriminator, there is just somethin~ about the way in
which a person dances rhythmically

that is vulgar;

something about the way in which a person manifests
their intelligence that is glib or sophistical; something
about the way in which they attempt to gain access to
social advantages that is unctuous or opportunisitic.
The higher-order

discriminator

would vehemently

reject the suggestion that this "something" might have
anything to do with the person's race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, or ethnic or religious affiliation.
But in fact, it is precisely

this primary disvalued

attribute from which the blemish spreads. Let us then
take the following set of beliefs
(2)

(a) agent A has primary disvalued
attribute P;
(b) agent A has n-ary attribute N; and
(e") N, in the way in which it is borne
by A, is of negative value,

plus the following stipulation
(i) For the higher-order discriminator,
A's possession of P is what in fact
confers negative value on N
as characteristic of the typical, i.e. scrupulous higherorder discriminator.
What makes higher-order
scrupulous?

discriminators

so

What, that is, explains the higher-order

discriminator's tendency to suppress (2.i)? Part of the
answer lies in the nature of ftrst-order discrimination.
First-order

discrimination

species of pseudorationality

can be understood

which relies heavily on

the mechanisms of rationalization
In rationalization,

as a

and dissociation.5

we apply a concept to something

- - - - ,....,
,....,
- ,....,
- - - - ,....,
,....,
,....,
,....,
,....,
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too broadly

or too narrowly,

magnifying

the

properties of the thing that instantiate the concept, and
minimizing those properties that fail to do so. The
perception of someone's race, gender, class, sexual
orientation, ethnic or religious affiliation, etc. as a
source of disvalue or value is the consequence
applying
being,"

value concepts
"citizen,"

like "person,"

"member

of

"human

of the community,"

"rational and responsible agent," etc. too narrowly, to
include only those individuals who have the primary
valued attribute, and exclude those individuals who
lack it. In dissociation,
terms of the negation

we identify something in
of the value concepts

in

question: Identifying Jews as subhuman, blacks as
childlike, gays as perverts, working- class people as
animals, or women as irrational, for example, are
ways of obscuring
individuals

one's identification

as fully mature,

responsible

of these
human

beings, and thereby obscuring one's recognition of
these individuals as full members of the community
with which one identifies.6 I submit that these habits
of thought

are of the

essence

of first-order

discrimination.
Higher-order discrimination then adds to this
the pseudorational mechanism of denial, in which we

18- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

suppress

recogmtIon

of an anomalous

thing or

property altogether, in order to preserve the internal
consistency of our beliefs or theory about the world,
ourselves, and other people.

I have already argued

that typically, higher-order discriminators are likely to
be fIrst-order discriminators as well; that is, they have
the same prejudices

that incline

them to view

individuals with the primary disvalued attributes as
inferior, not fully members of their community.
simple

first-order

discriminator

The

experiences

no

conflict in categorizing disvaluees as inferior beings to
be suppressed and exploited.

Therefore, she has no

need

ei ther

to exercise

discriminatory
existence.

denial,

responses

of her

own

or of the disvaluees'

By contrast, higher-order discriminators

must deny both, in order to preserve the consistency
of their beliefs. Because they are deeply affected, but
not fully reformed, by arguments and experiences that
suggest that discrimination is unjust, both their own
discriminatory
responses
discriminators.

responses
are

and the objects of those

anathema

to

higher-order

Because they do not want to believe

that their responses

are discriminatory,

they deny

them altogether. The higher-order discriminator may
deny, for example, that the primary disvalued attribute
in question is a disvalue at all, and yet helplessly

,....,
,...,
,....,
- - ,...,
,...,
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,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
,...,
-19

deplore the "fact" that nevertheless

there are no

competent or worthy candidates bearing this attribute
to be found; or hold any such candidate to a much
higher standard of acceptance or perfonnance than that
he ordinarily applies, relative to which her secondary
attributes can be disparaged. He may denigrate her
intelligence as cleverness; or ridicule her for working
too hard when she exhibits energy and commitment to
her work; or disparage her professional recognition as
achieved through hustling or connections.
These discriminatory

responses suggest that

the higher-order discriminator in fact categorizes such
members

of the disvalued

similarly

demeaning

primary

attributes,

group themselves

terms with respect
but experiences

in

to their

a conflict

of

conscience about doing so. Faced with the conflict
between first-order discriminatory habits of thought
and the dictates

of conscience,

the higher-order

discriminator exercises denial, above all in order to
avoid this conflict, by eradicating

its source from

awareness. The higher-order discriminator often fails
to acknowledge
members
circumvent

the very existence or presence of

of the disvalued
his own,

responses to them.?

groups,

first-order

in order to

discriminatory

For instance, he may ignore or

20- - ,...,
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fail to acknowledge

a disvaluee's contribution to a

general discussion, or respond to that contribution as
though someone else had made it. Or he may relegate
a disvaluee

to marginal

professional

setting.

or peripheral

tasks in a

Or he may simply ignore the

disvaluee altogether, avoiding all social interaction not
strictly required by social or institutional obligations.
In behaving

in this fashion,

the higher-order

discriminator

does not give vent to any sort of

malevolent impulse. His aim is not to insult or injure
the disvaluee in any way. Rather, his aim is to avoid
the painfully
contempt

conflicting

feelings

on the one hand,

- of disgust or

and the pangs

of

conscience on the other - that acknowledgement of the
disvaluee provokes.8
When social or institutional obligations make
denial of the disvaluee's presence impossible, denial
of (at the very least) her primary disvalued attribute,
and of its perceived disvalue, supplies a second-best
resolution to this conflict of conscience: Denial of the
disvaluee's

primary disvalued

attribute suppresses

from awareness the discriminatory habits of thought
elicited by it, hence similarly preserves consistency,
by placating the requirements of conscience.

This is

why the higher-order discriminator tends to suppress

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -21

(2.i).

Unfortunately,

to suppress habits of thought

from awareness is not to eradicate their influence, any
more than to suppress the disvaluee's existence from
awareness is to eradicate her influence. Higher-order
discrimination

is characterized

by that attitude in

which a certain habit of thought, namely fIrst-order
discrimination,

poisons

one's

evaluations

and

behavior, whether one acknowledges this or not.
The higher-order

discriminator

is inclined,

moreover, not to acknowledge this, no matter how
obviously incriminating his evaluations and behavior
may be to a disinterested observer.

For this would

expose the painful conflict of conscience the higherorder discriminator's
To acknowledge

behavior attempts to suppress.

this conflict, in tum, would be to

acknowledge the need to resolve it, i.e. the need to
work through and overcome the fIrst-order prejudices
that gave rise to it. But it is precisely in virtue of
those fIrst-order prejudices themselves that such a
project of self-improvement

stands very low on the

higher-order discriminator's list of priorities.
the resolution

of Oedipal

conflicts,

Unlike

emotional

problems, tensions in one's personal relationships, or
career

dilemmas,

prejudices

and

coming
learning

to terms
not

with one's

to inflict

them.

inadvertently on others just is not, in the last analysis,

22"..., - ,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,,....,"..., ,....,,....,,....,-

seen as terribly
discriminator.

important

by the higher-order

That is part of what makes him a

disriminator in the fIrst place.9
As I have painted

it, then, higher-order

discrimination is peculiarly the sickness of thoughtful,
well-intentioned

and conscientious

individuals who

nevertheless have failed adequately to confront and
work through their own prejudices, or who perhaps
have been too quickly satisfied by their ability to
marshall arguments

on behalf of doing so.
disingenuous

Such

individuals

are being neither

nor

hypocritical

when they deny that a person's race,

gender, class, sexual orientation, or ethnic or religious
affiliation affects their judgment of her competence or
worth.

They vehemently insist that this is so, they

want it to be so, and they genuinely believe it to be so.
They are, nevertheless,

mistaken.

Their efforts to

explain away each manifest expression
order discrimination
grounds
exhibits

on different and inconsistent

are unconvincing.
a degree

of higher-

of

And their behavior

otherwise

inexplicable

arbitrariness and idiosyncracy that severely strains our
attempts to apply the principle of charity in making
sense of it. Hence in order to understand the behavior
of higher-order discriminators,

we must watch what

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -23

they QQ, not what they

m.1O

For example,

these

attitudes

may

find

expression in an expectation of greater deference or
genuflection from a member of the disvalued group.
The simple first-order

discriminator

expresses his

anger at the violation of this expectation in certain
familiar stereotypes: the "uppity nigger" whose refusal
to behave subserviently

is seen as impudence

or

disrespect; or the "Jewish-American Princess," whose
assertiveness,

presumption

of self-worth,

and

expectation of attention and respect are seen as a sign
of being spoiled, selfish, or imperious.
higher-order discriminator,

such anger is displaced

into more subtle but similar reactions:
individual

But for the

may just feel angered

Such an

or personally

affronted by a woman's presumption of equality - in
personal, social, or intellectual status, or professional
worth, or as a competitor for social or professional
rewards; or unduly irritated by her failure to defer or
back down in argument.

She may be viewed as

forward in conversation, when in fact she contributes
no more and no less than anyone else; or stubborn,
unresponsive,

or impervious

to well-intentioned

criticism, when in fact the only acceptable response to
those criticisms,

in the eyes of the higher-order

discriminator, would be for her to concur with them
wholeheartedly and apologize for her dereliction. Or,
to

take

another

example,

the

higher-order

discriminator may feel invaded or compromised by a
black person's

jocularity

or willingness

to trade

friendly insults that one accepts as a matter of course
from those considered to be one's peers. The black
person may be viewed as overly familiar, insolent, or
presumptuous.

In all such cases, the disvaluee's

behavior is seen as a presumption,
accepted practice.!!

not a right or an

The higher-order discriminator is

tortured by the suspicion that he is somehow being
ridiculed, or shown insufficient respect, or that the
disvaluee's conduct bespeaks contempt.
In a recent compelling analysis of anger,12
N.J.H. Dent suggests that anger is based ultimately
on feelings of personal inferiority: These lead one to
overestimate the importance of others' expressions of
regard and esteem for one, which in turn multiplies
the number

of occasions

upon which one feels

slighted or demeaned when such expressions are not
forthcoming, or of insufficient magnitude relative to
one's importunate requirements.

This oversensitivity

to being slighted in turn provokes in one the desire to
rectify one's situation through retaliation, by lashing
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out at the offender. This analysis by itself does not, I
think, cover all cases of anger; nor does it explain the
origins of simple fIrst-order discrimination.
does

provide

insight

into

why

But it

higher-order

discriminators, like simple fIrst-order discriminators,
are apt to become so angry, so often, at imagined
slights from seemingly arrogant disvaluees. The more
inferior one feels, the more expressions of esteem one
requires.

And the more inferior one perceives

a

disvaluee to be, the more elaborate the disvaluee's
expression

of esteem

of one is required

to be.

Whereas a friendly nod from a perceived superior is
suffIcient to transport one to a state of grace, anything
less than a full-length obeisance from a perceived
inferior appears to be an insult.13 In all such cases,
irascibility regularly directed at particular members of
disvalued groups should not be dismissed as simply
an idiosyncrasy

of character,

even if it is not

intentionally directed at members of disvalued groups
as such. It is, nevertheless,

an overt expression of

higher-order discrimination.
A second, related example of behavior and
judgments distorted by higher-order discrimination is
the treatment

of disvaluees

in a way that would

constitute a clear insult or faux pas, if the person so
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treated were one of one's recognized

peers.

For

example, a white Gentile may privately make an antiSemitic remark to a black colleague, in a misguided
effort to establish rapport, when such a remark would
be seen as a serious social lapse even among other
white Gentiles.

Or a heterosexual

gratuitous disparaging

may make

remarks to a gay colleague

about her work or job performance, of a sort designed
to "cut her down to size" rather
constructive

criticism.

than provide

Or a man may make

offensively personal remarks to a woman colleague
about her physical

appearance,

personal

life, or

manner of dress, of a sort that would be highly
inappropriate if they were made to another man. Or
he might expect from a woman colleague

extra

forbearance for fits of temper, irresponsible conduct,
or extraordinary professional demands that he would
not from a man. The higher-order discriminator, in
other social contexts, may be acclaimed quite rightly
as a " prince among men"; to disvaluees, however, he
reveals himself as Mr. Hyde.l4

Yet unlike former

President Lyndon Johnson, who conferred with his
cabinet

through

an open bathroom

door, while

uninhibitedly and indiscreetly performing his morning
ablutions, the higher-order

discriminator

cannot be
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supposed to commit these boorish excesses with any
offensive intent.

Rather, he regards his response to

person's disvalued attributes as socially innocuous; as
an acceptable variation in social etiquette, keyed to the
variations among the personality traits of different
individuals.
A third example of such distorted behavior is
the implicit treatment of disvaluees as being obligated
by different rules of conduct than those which govern
oneself and those considered to be one's peers. One
may apply different criteria of interpretation

to the

behavior of disvaluees: Whereas enigmatic behavior
by valuees is excused,

overlooked,

or given the

benefit of the doubt, similar behavior on the part of
disvaluees

is interpreted

as proof

of vice

or

malevolence. This interpretation motivates the higherorder discriminator

not only to avoid, but also to

justify the avoidance of direct interaction with the
disvaluee, and thus avoid the conflict of conscience
described earlier. Or one may apply rules of honor,
loyalty, and responsiblity only to those considered to
be one's peers, but may have no scruples about
betraying the trust or confidentiality
who is implicitly
consideration.

viewed

of a disvaluee,

as unentitled

to such

Alternately, one may hold disvaluees

to far more stringent

moral

standards

than the
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members of one's own community in fact practice
among themselves.

Any violation of these standards

by the disvaluee then creates an irradicable moral
blemish to which the valuees are invulnerable,

by

reason of their status as valuees. These cases express
quite clearly the conviction that disvaluees just do not
have quite that same status, hence are not to be subject
to the same standards of treatment, as members of
one's recognized community - at the same time that
the higher-order discriminator vehemently and in all
honesty denies that any such discrimination is taking
place.

Indeed in all of these examples, the higher-

order discriminator

may sincerely

deny that the

person's race, gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnic
or religious affiliation, etc. arbitrarily influences his
evaluations, when his behavior shows patently that
they do.
III.
There are many forces that may intensify
higher-order

discrimination

consequences.

Among them are, fIrst and foremost,

complicitous

institutional

positions of responsibility
and social allegiances

and

practices.

its

social

Individuals in

often rank their personal

ahead of their professional

obligation to protect disvaluees from the pernicious
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effects

of higher-order

effectively

discrimination.

reward higher-order

Or they

discrimination,

by

regularly interpreting instances of it as expressions of
professional autonomy, and refusing in principle to
scrutinize suspected instances of it, on the grounds
that doing so would be unwarranted interference in an
organization's

internal affairs.

These institutions

often comply with the letter of antidiscriminatory
policies, by hiring members of disvalued groups to
temporary positions of high public visibility.
such individuals

are regularly

replaced

Since

by other,

equally competent but equally transient members of
the same disvalued

group, that group's visibility

within the institution

can be maintained,

without

infiltrating the entrenched system of discrimination
through permanent
abdicate

or seniority status.

the responsibility

This is to

for enforcing

those

antidiscriminatory policies to which such institutions
publicly claim to be committed.
Second,
resourcefulness
Someone

is

the

of the higher-order

intellectual
discriminator:

who is in fact deeply invested

disvaluational
always

there

recruit

in the

status of some primary attribute may
some further,

equally

irrelevant

attribute to explain her seemingly irrational judgment,
and

thus

deflect

the

charge

of higher-order
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discrimination: It may be said, for example, that the
disvalued attribute is not a person's race, gender,
class, sexual orientation, ethnic or religious affiliation,
etc., but rather his inability to "fit in," to "get along
with others,"

or "be a team player."

This is a

particularly familiar and dependable response, because
the evidence
materially

for ascribing
coextensive

this attribute

with

may be

the evidence

for

disvaluing the primary attribute at issue: Since the
disvaluee is in theory held to the same standards of
conduct that govern others in the community, but in
fact expected to conform to different ones, tailored to
his disvalued status, his inability to "fit in" can be
guaranteed at the outset 15
A third force that intensifies
discrimination

are the repressive,

habits of rationalization,
already discussed.

higher-order
pseudorational

dissociation,

and denial

Earlier I suggested that higher

-order discriminators were generally well-intentioned
individuals who had failed to come to terms with their
own prejudices.

I also mentioned

some possible

reasons for this failure: avoidance of conflicts of
conscience, feelings of personal inferiority, and first
-order discrimination

among them. Another reason

that should not be neglected

is that higher-order
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discriminators tend to rationalize, dissociate, or deny
the very existence
itself.

of higher-order

discrimination

They might claim, for example,

phenomenon

I have described

that the

is in truth simple

sensitivity to subtle variations and qualities among
individuals,

all of which

might

be relevant

to

questions of value or competence in a sufficiently
broad sense. Or they might agree that higher-order
discrimination exists, but dissociate it from their own
motives and behavior, as an anomalous phenomenon
that is too rare to merit further scrutiny. Or they might
just flatly deny the existence of anything like what I
have described as higher-order

discrimination,

and

deny as well the undeniably familiar instances of it
which I have invoked
analysis.

the foregoing

These tactics reinforce the tendencies of

higher-order
collusion

to anchor

discriminators
in

the

practice

to deny
of

their own

higher-order

discrimination, and to deny or minimize their need to
come to terms with it. Higher-order discriminators
are adept at the tactics of pseudorationality

because

they have so much self-esteem to lose by modifying
their beliefs. But ~
all, higher-order

must not be taken in. For above

discriminators

need to understand

that no one is fooled by their tactics. With the aid of
this understanding,

they may someday learn to stop

fooling themselves.
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Footnotes
1This paper is excerpted from Chapter

xn. of

a longer discussion, Rationality and the Structure of
the Self, work on which was supported by an Andrew
Mellon

Postdoctoral

University

Fellowship

and a Woodrow

at

Stanford

Wilson International

Fellowship.

Earlier versions were delivered to the

Philosophy

Department

University,

the Kennedy

Georgetown

University,

at George
Institute
Howard

Washington
of Ethics

University,

of
the

University of Mississippi, the City College of New
York, the University of Maryland, the Boston Area
Conference

on Character

and Morality hosted by

Radcliffe and Wellesley Colleges (Nancy Sherman
commenting), the Feminism and Racism Symposium
at the Eastern
Association
College,

Division

American

Philosophical

Convention,

Franklin

and Marshall

Williams

College,

Western

Michigan

University, and Brown University's Conference on
Ethics and Racism.
discussions.

I have benefitted from these

Laurence Thomas provided extensive

comments on an earlier draft.
2Thus I shall not be considering
which race, gender, etc. ~

cases in

relevant to judgments of a
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person's value or competence, e.g. as a role model in
a classroom,

or to provide

a unique and needed

perspective in a business venture or court of law. I
restrict the discussion

to consideration

of intrinsic

value or competence as determined by principles of
justice and equality. The contrast is with instrumental
value or competence

in furthering

some specified

social or institutional policy, of the sort that would
figure in arguments that would justify, e.g., refusing
to sell real estate in a certain neighborhood to a black
family solely because doing so would lower property
values, or hiring a woman to a professional position
solely in order to meet affmnative action quotas, or
refusing to serve Asians at one's family diner solely
because it would be bad for business. Whether these
should be included under the rubric of first-order
discrimination,

hypocrisy, prudence, or mere moral

pusillanimity is too large a topic to address here.
30f course there are other, more convoluted
cases of higher-order

discrimination

that represent

epicyclic variations on the straightforward
shall be examining.
wildly exaggerate

cases I

For example, being black may
the value attached to classical

styling in a black dancer,

if classical

styling is

perceived as something the person had to overcome

great innate and cultural obstacles to achieve. In either
case, being black functions as a primary disvalued
attribute because it carries a presumption of inferiority
into the evaluation of further attributes of the person.
4 Is it perhaps

too strong to claim that a

primary disvalued attribute poisons the higher-order
discriminator's

evaluation

other attributes?

of all of the disvaluee's

Can't a higher-order discriminator

respect a disvaluee's traits of character in a certain
restricted area, despite his disvalued status?

I am

inclined to think not. For this seems to occur almost
exclusively
conforms

to the

stereotypes.
admired

when

the "valued"

attribute

higher-order

discriminator's

For example,

for his athletic

itself

a black man may be
prowess

but encounter

hostility when he runs for political office.

In such

cases, the higher-order discriminator's admiration and
respect for the stereotypical trait is not unalloyed. It is
tempered

by a certain smug complacency

at the

disvaluee's confmnation of his disvalued status in the
very cultivation and expression of that stereotypical
trait. To sustain the above objection, we would need
to see a higher-order

discriminator

exhibiting

unalloyed admiration and respect for nonstereotypical
traits, such that these positive feelings did not. in turn.

positively

reform the higher-order

prejudicial

attitude

discriminator's

toward the person's

primary

disvalued attribute: Someone who sincerely respects
and admires a disvaluee for non stereotypical reasons,
without feeling threatened or invaded, has already
begun to weaken the psychological edifice on which
her discriminatory

evaluation

of the person as a

disvaluee is based.
51 discuss the concepts of pseudorationality,
rationalization,
length

in

dissociation,

"Two

Philosophical

and denial at greater

Conceptions

of

the

Self,"

Studies 48, 2 (September 1985), 173-

197; reprinted

in The Philosopher's

Annual

VIII

(1985), and "Pseudorationality," in Brian McLaughlin
and Amelie

o.

Rorty, Eds., Perspectives

on Self-

Deception (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988).
In characterizing first-order discrimination in
terms of rationalization

and dissociation, I mean to

describe the actual behavior of simple first-order
discriminators.

If it is true, as some have suggested,

that first-order

discrimination

is symptomatic

of a

repressed attraction to a disvalued attribute, or fear
that one has it (e.g. blacks' uninhibitedness, women's
sensitivity),

then the explanation

of first-order
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discrimination may invoke denial as well.
6The irony in the case of racism is that there is
a substantial

literature

in biology and the social

sciences that indicates that almost all purportedly
white Americans

have between

five and twenty

percent black ancestry - hence are, according to this
country's entrenched "just one trace" convention of
racial classification, black. See Joel Williamson, A
New People (New York: Free Press, 1974); L.L.
Cavalli-Sforza

and W.F. Bodmer, The Genetics of

Human Populations (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman
and Co., 1971), pp. 490-499; T.E. Reed, "Caucasian
Genes in American Negroes," Science 165 (1969),
762-768; P.L. Workman,

B.S. Blumberg

and A.J.

Cooper, "Selection, Gene Migration and Polymorphic
Stability in a U.S. White and Negro Population,"
American Journal of Human Genetics 15, 4 (1963),
429-437; Bentley Glass and C.C. Li, "The Dynamics
of Racial Admixture - An Analysis of the American
Negro,"

American

Journal of Human Genetics

5

(1953), 1-20. For these references and discussion on
this matter I am indebted
Edmonson

to Professor

of Tulane University's

Monro S.

Department

of

Anthropology.
7This may contribute to an explanation of the
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phenomenon, noted by Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo
(Racial

Attitudes

Interpretations

in

America:

(Cambridge,

Trends

Mass.:

and

Harvard

University Press, 1985), that in the last twenty years,
white support for the principles

of equality and

fairness for blacks have increased, concurrently with
white opposition

to the implemenation

of those

principles.
8Denial of a person's presence as a way of
avoiding conflicting

feelings about them is fairly

common. A very handsome man may be the object of
denial, when others' feelings of attraction

to him

conflict with their conviction that these feelings are
inappropriate; a very fortunate or charismatic person
may be the object of denial, when other's feelings of
envy or resentment conflict with a similar conviction.
Or a homely person may be the object of denial when
other's feelings of repugnance
kindness

or social

good

conflict with their

will.

Higher-order

discrimination is most analogous to this last-described
case.
9Here I think it would be wrong to interpret
the higher-order

discriminator

as concerned

with

personal problems and not with social ones. Rather,
the higher-order discriminator belittles the importance
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of addressing a certain personal problem.
1DOne implication of characterizing

higher-

order discrimination as a sickness rather than a fault is
that higher-order

discriminators

are, in the last

analysis, not morally responsible for their behavior.
This conclusion seems unpalatable in many respects.
Nevertheless, I am reluctantly pessimistic about the
efficacy

of appeals

discriminators.

to reason

in higher-order

Because their reason - or rather, their

dogged pseudorationality

- is so inherently a part of

the problem, I am inclined to think that the solution
should be sought in the adoption of some version of
Strawson's "objective attitude" toward them; i.e. that
higher-order

discriminators

must be managed

-

perhaps psychotherapeutically - rather than addressed.
I suggest an explanation for this kind of intractability
in

"Two

Conceptions

"Pseudorationality,"

of

the

Self"

and

op. cit. Note 5.

11The view of the disvaluee's assumption of
equality as a msumption

may explain the higher-

order discriminator's otherwise inexplicable umbrage
at being complemented by a disvaluee: An inferior is
in no position to confer favors of any kind.
12N.J.H. Dent, The Moral Psycholo~y of the
Virtues

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University Press,

1984), 155-160.
l3In the deep South up to the mid-1960s, for
example, for a black person to meet the gaze of a
white person was perceived as an offense; and for a
black man even to look at a white woman was to
. invite lynching.
14This often creates additional difficulties in
identitfying cases of higher-order discrimination for
what they are. The testimony of a disvaluee suffers a
credibility problem at the outset.
severely exascerbated

This problem is

if the testimony concerns a

higher-order discriminator whom others have every
reason

to regard

as a saint.

Under

these

circumstances, any charge of inconsistency - whether
it comes from others and targets the disvaluee, or
comes from the disvaluee and targets the higher-order
discriminator

- is in the eye of the beholder.

higher-order discriminators

For

regard coarse, tasteless,

or brutal behavior toward disvaluees as called forth by
them and so warranted; hence as fully consistent with
the most highly refined manners and courtly civility
toward others.
15Under these circumstances,

the disvaluee,

too, may be accused rightly of pseudorationality,

if

his personal investment in the theoretical standards of
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equal treatment

is so great that he rationalizes,

dissociates, or denies the facts of discrimination that
blatantly confront him. But I argue elsewhere ("The
Meaning of 'Ought' and the Loss of Innocence",
unpublished

paper,

1989) that self-preservation

reQuires that, although such ideals ultimately must die,
they must not do so without a long and painful
struggle.

The concept of personal investment

discussed

at greater length in "Moral Theory and

Moral

Alienation,"

The Journal

is

of Philosophy

LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118.
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